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THE CURIOUS ABSENCE OF
PROVOCATION AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
IN ASSAULT CASES
MICHAEL S. DAUBER†
INTRODUCTION
Kent Davis returned home on February 22, 2008, took his
toddler into the bedroom, fed her a bottle, and sat down to watch
some television.1 His wife, Rachel, noticed that their daughter
had spilled her bottle, and the two began to argue.2 During the
argument, Rachel opened the window and yelled for the police;
she also spat on Davis.3 When she tried to call the police, Davis
grabbed her cell phone and “snapped it in half.”4 Davis then took
a knife from the kitchen and assaulted Rachel, punching her and
stabbing her in the shoulder and neck until he finally called the
police himself, saying, “ ‘I did it.’ ”5 Davis was arrested and
“charged with attempted murder in the second degree, assault in
the first degree, and child endangerment.”6
At trial, Davis admitted to stabbing Rachel, but claimed that
he only grabbed the knife intending to “scare her and stop her
from yelling,” not to kill her.7 However, everything “went a blur,”
and he “snapped” and “blacked out” during the assault.8 Davis
was convicted of assault and child endangerment, and sentenced
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Davis v. Perez, No. 13-CV-4950, 2015 WL 13707517, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4,
2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 13-CIV-4950, 2018 WL 1773135
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2018).
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to 11 years in prison.9 On appeal,10 and in a subsequent petition
for habeas corpus, Davis argued, among other things, that he
should have been entitled to mitigation of his assault charge due
to extreme emotional disturbance (“EED”).11 The federal habeas
court held, however, that this defense could not have succeeded
because “EED is not available to a defendant charged with
assault” in New York.12
The Davis case illustrates a profound and longstanding
paradox in criminal law: the mitigating EED and adequate
provocation13 defenses are often available for homicide but not for
assault, even though the same physical acts and same mitigating
factors may be present in both types of cases.14 Put another way,
mitigation by affirmative defense is available when a defendant
intends to kill someone, but not where a defendant merely
intends to cause someone physical injury, even though the
defendant may have been just as emotionally disturbed in the
latter case as in the former. Further, a defendant charged with
both assault and attempted homicide could receive a mitigating
jury instruction on the attempted homicide charge but not the
assault, despite the fact that the jury is asked to evaluate the
defendant’s intentions on the exact same criminal act.15
This Note argues that the EED and common law adequate
provocation defenses should be extended to intentional assault
offenses16 in all states, as a matter of fairness and conceptual

9

Id. at *3.
See generally People v. Davis, 90 A.D.3d 461 (1st Dep’t 2011).
11
Davis, 2015 WL 13707517, at *1, *5.
12
Id. at *11 n.13 (citing People v. Charles, 13 Misc.3d 985, 987 (Sup. Ct. Kings
Cnty. Oct. 3, 2006); Rooplall v. Griffin, No. 12-CV-1542, 2013 WL 2455951, at *8
(E.D.N.Y. June 6, 2013)).
13
For the purposes of this Note, the term “adequate provocation” is synonymous
with “heat of passion.”
14
Only four states recognize an affirmative defense or statutory reduction in the
classification of assault for adequate provocation, extreme emotional disturbance, or
heat of passion: Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-202(2)(a)–(b) (West 2016)),
Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.040 (West 1984)), Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.052(1)(1) (West 2017)), and Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.12(A)–(B)
(West 2019)). Virginia recognizes mitigation for “malicious wounding.” Williams v.
Commonwealth, 767 S.E.2d 252, 256 (Va. Ct. App. 2015) (recognizing mitigation
under VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–51 (West 1975)).
15
See Rooplall, 2013 WL 2455951, at *8 n.4.
16
For the purposes of this Note, the term “assault” refers to the intentional
infliction of an injury on another person, absent the intent to kill (since assault with
intent to kill would amount to attempted homicide, for which the EED and adequate
provocation defenses are frequently available in states that refer to these offenses in
10
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symmetry. As noted in the Introduction provided above, every
justification given for these defenses in the homicide context
applies a fortiori to assault charges, where a defendant is
implicitly less culpable given the intention to merely injure, not
kill, the victim. Part I provides a background history and
conceptual framework for understanding the EED and adequate
provocation defenses in the homicide context, as well as in the
few states that allow mitigation for assault. Part II argues that
such mitigation should be allowed for assault as well. Finally,
Part III proposes model legislation for implementing the defense
in every jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
This section provides a basic doctrinal overview of the
adequate provocation doctrine and the modern EED affirmative
defense, including the way those doctrines have historically
operated in homicide cases and the few jurisdictions that extend
the defense to assault cases.17 Section A provides an overview of
the historical development of the “heat of passion” and “adequate
provocation” doctrines, with a particular emphasis on the
concepts of mens rea and criminal culpability. Section B
discusses the advent of the modern common law versions of both
doctrines and the Model Penal Code (“MPC”) EED defense.
Section C analyzes several possible criticisms of the defenses in
theory and practice, with an eye toward how those objections
would apply if the defense were permitted in assault cases.
Finally, Section D sets out ways in which adequate provocation
and EED operate in jurisdictions that currently allow the defense
in assault cases, providing a roadmap for integrating the defense
in jurisdictions that do not currently allow it.
A.

Culpability and the History of the “Heat of Passion” and
“Adequate Provocation” Defense

1.

Culpability

Homicide is a crime in every jurisdiction of the United
States, but a defendant can be found more or less criminally
responsible—and thus face more or less severe punishment—

terms of attempted homicide rather than as assault offenses). See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 120.10 (McKinney 1996); id. § 125.25(1)(a)(i) ( 2019).
17
See infra Section I.D.
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based on a variety of factors. The most decisive factor in
determining criminal responsibility is the concept of
“culpability.”18 Culpability is the measure of how criminally
responsible a defendant is for his or her action.19 While all
crimes require both an actus reus and mens rea, the actus reus of
all homicides is substantially the same: one person unlawfully
causes the death of another.20 Within that broad category,
however, are gradations of culpability that warrant more or less
severe consequences, depending on the facts and circumstances
of the crime.
Culpability is largely determined by measuring the mens
rea, or mental state, of the defendant. Mens rea reflects the idea
that the defendant has done something morally blameworthy21
that deserves the moral scorn of the community,22 accompanied
by criminal sanctions. Mens rea largely refers to the particular
blameworthy state of mind that the defendant possessed at the
time of the crime.23 The law commonly recognizes four general
criminal mental states.24 First, a defendant acts intentionally or
willfully if he or she purposely engages in prohibited conduct or
causes the prohibited result.25
Second, a defendant acts
knowingly if he or she is aware of the existence of certain facts
that make the conduct a crime, or believes them to exist.26 Third,
a defendant acts recklessly if he or she is “aware of and
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that
a criminal result will occur, where “[t]he risk [is] of such nature
and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would

18
19

See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952).
See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 114–15 (8th ed.

2018).
20

Id. at 473 (defining homicide).
See id. at 114 (quoting Francis Bowes Sayre, The Present Significance of
“Mens Rea” in the Criminal Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 399, 411–12 (1934)
(describing mens rea as “a general immorality of motive”)).
22
See Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179–81
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).
23
See DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 115.
24
Id. at 117, 123, 125–26. The term “malice” was also used at common law. Id.
at 130.
25
Id. at 117.
26
Id. at 123; see generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(2) (McKinney 2019); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (AM. L. INST. 2019).
21
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observe in the situation.”27 Finally, a defendant acts negligently
if he or she fails to recognize the risk that such a criminal result
Additionally, many jurisdictions recognize an
will occur.28
extreme form of recklessness, often called “depraved
indifference,” by which a defendant acts recklessly “under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life,” such that he or she can be thought to intend to
cause the victim’s death.29
Criminal offenses are typically separated out into degrees
based on the culpability of the defendant. For instance, New
York divides homicide offenses into several degrees based largely
on the defendant’s mental state and the attendant
circumstances. Accordingly, first and second degree murder
charges reflect intentional or depraved indifference murder
(excluding felony murder, which is beyond the scope of this
Note);30 first degree manslaughter reflects intentional homicide
under the influence of EED;31 second degree manslaughter
reflects reckless homicide;32 and criminally negligent homicide
reflects accidental homicides committed with negligence.33
2.

Heat of Passion and Adequate Provocation

Before there were distinctions among homicide offenses, all
defendants convicted of homicide were put to death, regardless of
the type of killing at issue.34 That changed in 1794, when
Pennsylvania separated homicide offenses into degrees, such that
only “particularly heinous” homicide convictions warranted the
Subsequent statutes and reforms codified
death penalty.35
manslaughter, an intentional homicide in which the defendant
killed the victim while operating under the heat of passion

27
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(3) (McKinney 2019); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2)(c) (AM. L. INST. 2019) (virtually the same language).
28
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (AM. L. INST. 2019).
29
Id. § 210.2(1)(b) (AM. L. INST. 2019); see DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 486.
Although “depraved indifference” may not be listed as a separate mental state,
either in the MPC or in its state law analogs, courts have held that “depraved
indifference to human life is a culpable mental state.” People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d
288, 294 (N.Y. 2006).
30
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1) (McKinney 2019); id. § 125.25(2).
31
Id. § 125.20(2).
32
Id. § 125.15(1).
33
Id. § 125.10 (2020).
34
See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, PART II, cmt. to § 210.2, at 13–
16 (AM. L. INST. 1980) [hereinafter “ALI Commentary”].
35
Id. at 16.

200

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:195

following adequate provocation,36
without malice or
premeditation. 37 A defendant acted under the heat of passion if
he or she acted under the influence of a “[v]iolent, intense,
highwrought, or enthusiastic emotion,”38 or under an “intense or
vehement emotional excitement of the kind prompting violent
and aggressive action.”39
Generally speaking, “[t]he purpose of the extreme emotional
disturbance defense is to permit the defendant to show that his
actions were caused by a mental infirmity not arising to the level
of insanity, and that he is less culpable for having committed
them.”40 The result is to mitigate the seriousness of the
conviction and the subsequent sentence from murder to a lesser
criminal offense, by acknowledging that a person operating under
such an infirmity was in fact less culpable than one who
deliberated and reflected on his or her actions before killing
because of an unwillingness to control malicious desires.41 “A
defendant who pleads provocation [or EED] asks the community
to mitigate his wrongful act of killing from murder to
manslaughter, and to do so because another person provoked him
into a rage that made it much more difficult to control his violent
The defendant who invokes the adequate
response.”42
provocation or EED defense “seeks to identify cases of intentional
homicide where the situation is as much to blame as the actor.”43
To mitigate a homicide offense from murder to manslaughter
under the common law adequate provocation defense, a
defendant typically had to show: (1) adequate provocation,
(2) homicidal acts committed under the heat of passion, (3) that
the defendant lacked a “reasonable opportunity for the passion to
36

Id.; See also DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 501–02.
See ALI Commentary, supra note 34, at 44.
38
People v. Borchers, 325 P.2d 97, 102 (Cal. 1958) (citation omitted); see also
DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 501.
39
State v. Guebara, 696 P.2d 381, 385 (Kan. 1985).
40
People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 302 (N.Y. 1976), aff’d sub nom. Patterson
v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
41
See Paul Litton, Commentary, Is Psychological Research on Self-Control
Relevant to Criminal Law?, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 725, 729–30 (2014) (“Arguably,
one reason the purposeful or knowing harm doer is more culpable than the reckless
or negligent harm doer is that the former has more control over the consequences of
her conduct.”) (footnote omitted).
42
Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The Heat of Passion and Blameworthy Reasons to Be
Angry, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 414 (2018).
43
Stuart M. Kirschner et al., The Defense of Extreme Emotional Disturbance: A
Qualitative Analysis of Cases in New York County, 10 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y AND L. 102,
103 (2004) (quoting ALI Commentary, supra note 34, at 71)) (emphasis added).
37
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cool,” and (4) a causal connection between the provocation, the
passion, and the killing.44 Historically, adequate provocation was
recognized: (1) where one found his or her spouse in the act of
adultery; (2) during mutual combat; (3) during a serious assault
or battery; (4) where a defendant saw the victim inflict a serious
injury on a close relative; or (5) during an unlawful arrest.45
Provocation was inadequate if a defendant merely learned of
their spouse’s adultery, rather than catching and killing the
victim during the adulterous act—in flagrante delicto.46
Homicide in response to a less serious battery was also
inadequate.47 Perhaps most significantly, words alone, absent
further circumstances, were never considered adequate
provocation.48
B.

Modern Common Law and the Model Penal Code

While the categorical approach to mitigation has the benefit
of confining the provocation defense to particularly serious
circumstances, limiting the defense to a set number of situations
likely does not reflect every conceivable scenario in which a
defendant is not as culpable for their actions as one who commits
a premeditated murder. As a result, the modern common law
approach is to allow a defendant to establish mitigation if the
defendant’s passion was reasonable under the circumstances:
“The provocative conduct by the victim may be physical or verbal,
but the conduct must be sufficiently provocative that it would
cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or
without due deliberation and reflection.”49 And while many
common law jurisdictions still hold that “words alone,” without
more, cannot serve as adequate provocation,50 some jurisdictions
do recognize provocation where the information conveyed in the
44
Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 721 (Md. 1991) (quoting Cox v. State, 534
A.2d 1333 (Md. 1998)); DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 501.
45
DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 502 & nn.192–96.
46
See Holmes v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1946] 31 Cr. App. 123 (HL)
127, 129–31.
47
See Commonwealth v. Webb, 97 A. 189, 191–93 (Pa. 1916).
48
See Girouard, 583 A.2d at 723 (holding that the defendant did not establish
adequate provocation where his wife uttered offensive words and threatened to have
him dishonorably discharged from the military); see ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD
N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 93–94 (3d ed. 1982); DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 502.
49
People v. Moye, 213 P.3d 652, 660 (Cal. 2009); see also People v. Beltran, 301
P.3d 1120, 1125 (Cal. 2013) (citations omitted).
50
DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 503; see also Girouard, 538 A.2d at 722
(collecting cases).
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words “inform[s] the listener of an incident . . . that might have
constituted adequate provocation had it been observed
contemporaneously.”51
Jurisdictions following the MPC do not delineate specific
categories of sufficient provocation—instead, they establish a
statutory affirmative defense that allows mitigation where a
defendant can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he
or she acted “under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or
excuse.”52
The “reasonableness” of the disturbance is
“determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s
situation under the circumstances as [the defendant] believes
them to be.”53 Note that the test is not whether the defendant’s
actions—in this context, homicide—were reasonable: the test is
whether it was reasonable for the defendant to become extremely
emotionally disturbed given his or her perception of the
circumstances.54
Indeed, the requirement that the defendant’s disturbance be
reasonable cannot be understated. “In the end, the question is
whether the actor’s loss of self-control can be understood in terms
that arouse sympathy in the ordinary citizen.”55 Even if the
defendant was extremely emotionally disturbed at the time of the
killing, the offense will not be mitigated from murder to
manslaughter if the disturbance was not reasonable. A notable
example is People v. Casassa, in which a defendant killed his
former romantic partner after she broke up with him and began
seeing other men.56 On the night of the killing, Casassa tried to
51
DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 503 n.210 (collecting cases). Note that Georgia
specifically provides an affirmative defense to a charge of simple assault or simple
battery when the victim provoked the defendant with “opprobrious or abusive
language.” GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-25 (West 2019).
52
Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(b) (AM. L. INST. 2019), with N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.25(1)(a)(i) (McKinney 2019) (virtually identical language).
53
Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(b) (AM. L. INST. 2019), with N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.25(1)(a)(i) (McKinney 2019) (virtually identical language).
54
See ALI Commentary, supra note 34, at 50 (“The ultimate test, however, is
objective; there must be a ‘reasonable’ explanation or excuse for the actor’s
disturbance.”).
55
Kirschner et al., supra note 43, at 104 (quoting ALI commentary, supra note
34, at 63); see also People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, 680 (N.Y. 1980) (noting that the
legislative purpose behind the affirmative defense “was to allow the finder of fact the
discretionary power to mitigate the penalty when presented with a situation which,
under the circumstances, appears to them to have caused an understandable
weakness in one of their fellows.”).
56
Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d at 672.
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give the victim bottles of alcohol as gifts, which she rejected.57
Casassa “produced a steak knife which he had brought with him”
to the victim’s residence, “stabbed [her] several times in the
throat, dragged her body to the bathroom and submerged it in a
bathtub full of water to ‘make sure she was dead.’ ”58 Although
Casassa was certainly extremely emotionally disturbed at the
time of the killing, New York’s highest court affirmed the
conviction without mitigation, holding that the disturbance must
be objectively reasonable under the circumstances in order to
qualify for mitigation.59 The Court affirmed that Casassa’s
disturbance was “so peculiar to him that it was unworthy of
mitigation.”60
In sum, the current legal landscape allows a defendant to
mitigate a homicide crime down from murder to manslaughter if
he or she acted under the heat of passion or extreme emotional
disturbance, depending on the jurisdiction. In a common law
adequate provocation jurisdiction, the provocation must be such
that the defendant’s passion was reasonable. In an EED
jurisdiction, the disturbance must be reasonable under the
circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.
C.

Criticisms of Adequate Provocation and EED as Mitigating
Factors

Notwithstanding the advantages of grading homicide
offenses by the defendant’s level of culpability, the adequate
provocation and EED defenses are not without their critics. For
example, feminist writers have criticized the defense as unfair to
women. Emily L. Miller wrote that “[v]oluntary manslaughter
has never been a female-friendly doctrine” because it historically
allowed husbands to receive reduced sentences for killing their
wives.61 Moreover, Miller observed that the MPC’s expansion of
the defense, beyond the historical situation in which a defendant
caught his spouse in the act of sexual intercourse with another
person, means that “violence by domestic partners that would
have been labeled murder under the common law has been

57

Id.
Id.
59
Id. at 679–81.
60
Id. at 680.
61
Emily L. Miller, (Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender, and the
Model Penal Code, 50 EMORY L.J. 665, 667 (2001).
58
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labeled manslaughter under MPC-based statutory codes.”62
Moreover, the MPC version of the defense incorporates “the
masculine assumptions of the common law of voluntary
manslaughter[,]” given that “[e]ach element of the heat of passion
defense originates in a masculine understanding of human
behavior.”63 Similarly, Professor Victoria Nourse argues that the
old common law provocation requirement offered more protection
than the MPC defense because the former was only available
where the defendant caught their spouse in the act of adultery.64
Indeed, “reform has transformed passion from the classical
adultery to the modern dating and moving and leaving.”65
The defense has also been criticized because it has
historically been used as a “gay panic” defense, in which a
defendant kills a victim who made a nonthreatening homosexual
advance on the defendant.66 The problem is that “most courts
believe that a jury could find reasonably that a [non-threatening
homosexual advance] is sufficient provocation to incite the
Reasonable Man to lose his self-control and kill in the heat of
passion.”67
The adequate provocation and EED defenses have also been
criticized on the ground that the reasonable person standard is
difficult to use consistently in practice. According to Jonathan
Witmer-Rich, “[a] recurring problem with this formulation is the
difficulty of how much to ‘individualize’ the reasonable person—
how
to
determine
which
characteristics
of
the
defendant . . . should be imported into this ‘reasonable person.’ ”68
Further, “psychological research on self-control does not shed
light on the self-control strength of ordinary or reasonable
persons in general, let alone their self-control strength in the face

62

Id. at 666.
Id. at 669 (citation omitted).
64
Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132–33 (1997); see also Kirschner et al., supra note 43,
at 129–30.
65
Nourse, supra note 64, at 1333.
66
Joseph R. Williams, “I Don’t Like Gays, Okay?” Use of the “Gay Panic” Murder
Defense in Modern American Courtrooms: The Ultimate Miscarriage of Justice, 78
ALB. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2015). See generally Joshua Dressler, When “Heterosexual”
Men Kill “Homosexual” Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and
the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726 (1995).
67
Dressler, supra note 66, at 730; see generally Robert B. Mison, Homophobia in
Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV.
133 (1992).
68
Witmer-Rich, supra note 42, at 411–12 (collecting cases).
63
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of the kind of provocation at hand.”69 Difficulties also arise due
to the lack of set guidance on the factors that are included in the
relevant circumstances surrounding the defendant’s actions.70
For instance, the defendant in People v. Goetz argued that he
acted in self-defense based on the age and race of the victims.71
The U.S. Constitutional limits offer a baseline protection against
a jury using race in its determination of relevant circumstances,
but absent some other clarification or limitation specific to that
case, nothing stops a jury from considering the race of a victim
in its determination..72 This opens the door to race-based
mitigation decisions. Juries have significantly broad discretion
in determining whether provocation is reasonable, which might
allow mitigation in domestic violence cases or other situations
that society should not treat as granting reasonable provocation
as a matter of public policy.
However, for all of the defense’s flaws, some worries may be
overblown. Some studies suggest that the defense is most
successful when a defendant cannot prove insanity or selfdefense, but can convince the jury that he or she was extremely
emotionally disturbed and operating under the fear of harm to
oneself or another.73 For example, a survey of ten years of cases
in New York County suggests that juries “are unreceptive to
claims of EED when the defendant’s prevailing emotion at the
time of the crime was anger unmitigated by a reasonable . . . fear
of physical harm” sufficient to invoke the defense.74 While the
classic scenario many individuals envision for the defense is one
in which the defendant became extremely enraged, the actual
cases suggest that EED serves as mitigation only where common
sense suggests that a defendant acted in self-defense or was
actually psychologically disturbed or insane despite the fact that
he or she could not fit the technical requirements of other legal
defenses. As a result, the potential flaws in the defense should
69
Litton, supra note 41, at 733. However, this fact may not be decisive:
“[T]hough duress and provocation may involve self-control failures, the self-control
research cannot help us discern the right outcome in any particular case, and
thereby does not give us reason to question current standards.” Id. at 733–34.
70
Cf. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a)(i) (McKinney 2019) (absence of factors).
71
See generally 68 N.Y.2d 96 (N.Y. 1986).
72
Stephen L. Carter, Comment, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.
J. 420, 422–23 (1988); see also, e.g., Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869
(2017) (recognizing that if a jury’s decision to convict relied upon racial stereotypes
or animus, the decision would violate the 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
73
Kirschner et al., supra note 43, at 130–31.
74
Id. at 130.
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not preclude its expansion from homicide cases to assault cases if
it continues to be recognized for homicide.
D. Adequate Provocation and EED As Applied to Assault in
Minority Jurisdictions
Although most jurisdictions confine the adequate
provocation and EED defenses to homicide offenses, some
jurisdictions allow defendants charged with assault to establish
mitigation if: (1) the defendant acted under the influence of EED
or under the heat of passion, and (2) it was reasonable for them
to become disturbed or for their passions to become inflamed.75
In these jurisdictions, the defense mitigates the defendant’s
crime down a level of severity,76 just as a defendant establishing
mitigation against a homicide charge is convicted of a less serious
offense.
For example, Kentucky allows a defendant to “establish in
mitigation that he acted under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance” in any prosecution for a crime “in which
intentionally causing physical injury or serious physical injury is
an element of the offense.”77 Like jurisdictions that follow the
MPC homicide statutes, whether the disturbance is reasonable
“is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the
defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant
believed them to be.”78 The stated goal of the addition was “to
provide the same type of mitigating, degree-reducing factor in the
law of assault as exists in the law of homicide.”79 The defense is
an affirmative defense that allows a defendant to be convicted of
a less serious felony if established.80 An instructive example is
Creamer v. Commonwealth, in which the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky held that a defendant was entitled to an EED
75
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.040 (West 2021); Dixon v. Commonwealth,
No. 2018-CA-000616, 2019 WL 2068538, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App. May 10, 2019).
76
See, e.g., Dixon, 2019 WL 2068538, at *4.
77
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.040.
78
Id. § 507.020 (West 2021). Kentucky defines EED as “a temporary state of
mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one’s judgment, and to cause
one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of the extreme emotional
disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes.” Dixon, 2019 WL 2068538,
at *4 (quoting McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468–69 (Ky. 1986)).
79
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.040 cmt. (West 1974) [hereinafter “LRC
Commentary”].
80
Dixon, 2019 WL 2068538, at *4 (stating that “first-degree assault committed
under the influence of EED is a Class D felony whereas first-degree assault in the
absence of EED or some other mitigating factor is [a] Class A felony.”).

2021]

THE CURIOUS ABSENCE OF PROVOCATION

207

instruction where his mother had previously slapped him and
removed his dog from the house, since a reasonable jury might
have found the resulting emotional disturbance reasonable.81
Missouri also allows statutory mitigation for assault.82
Although it does not recognize a separate affirmative defense, the
defense is incorporated into the grading of the elements of
assault. For instance, first degree assault occurs where a
defendant “attempts to kill or knowingly causes or attempts to
cause serious physical injury to another person,”83 but a
defendant commits second degree assault with the same conduct
if the defendant acted “under the influence of sudden passion
arising out of adequate cause.”84 One case in which this played
out was State v. Taylor, where the Missouri Court of Appeals
held that a jury instruction on mitigation could be appropriately
applied to a drunken road rage incident, because such facts
“could create rage, anger or fear so extreme as to cause [the]
defendant’s conduct . . . to be the product of passion, not
reason.”85 Applying the instruction, the jury mitigated the
defendant’s conviction down from first degree assault to second
degree assault.86
Some states also recognize adequate provocation as an
offense-specific mitigating circumstance. For instance, Colorado
allows a defendant to establish heat of passion as a circumstance
that “reduce[s] the severity of the penalty attached to the
offense.”87 Under Colorado law, a first degree assault committed
under “a sudden heat of passion, caused by a serious and highly
provoking act,” that would “excite an irresistible passion in a
reasonable person,” is mitigated to a lower level offense for the

81

629 S.W.2d 324, 325 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.052 (West 2017).
83
Id. § 565.050(1).
84
Id. § 565.052(1)(1). “Sudden passion” is defined as “passion directly caused by
and arising out of provocation by the victim or another acting with the victim which
passion arises at the time of the offense and is not solely the result of former
provocation.” Id. § 565.002(15). The statute defines “adequate cause” as one “that
would reasonably produce a degree of passion in a person of ordinary temperament
sufficient to substantially impair an ordinary person’s capacity for self-control.” Id.
§ 565.002(1).
85
770 S.W.2d 531, 534–35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (indicating that the
circumstances as a whole, including the defendant’s intoxication, supported the fact
that he may have acted under the heat of passion).
86
Id.
87
People v. Suazo, 867 P.2d 161, 166 (Colo. App. 1993).
82

208

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:195

purposes of sentencing.88 Colorado’s statute evolved in response
to the perverse result that a defendant charged with a non-fatal
assault who was acting under the heat of passion could
potentially have served more time than a defendant convicted of
manslaughter.89 Although heat of passion is a sentencing
mitigator90 rather than an affirmative defense,91 the burden
shifts to the prosecution to disprove heat of passion beyond a
reasonable doubt, and an appropriate jury instruction is given
“once the issue of heat of passion provocation is injected into a
case,” based on the evidence.92
Ohio law contains a separate assault statute that allows
mitigation for assaults committed with adequate provocation.93
There, a felonious assault charge is mitigated to a lesser
“aggravated” assault charge where the defendant commits a
felonious assault “while under the influence of sudden passion or
in a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious
provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient
to incite the defendant into using deadly force . . . .”94 Notably,
“[i]n a trial for felonious assault, where the defendant presents
sufficient evidence of serious provocation (such that a jury could
both reasonably acquit defendant of felonious assault and convict
defendant of aggravated assault), an instruction on aggravated
assault (as a different degree of felonious assault) must be
given.”95 This is the case despite the fact that the offense as a
88
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-202(2)(a)–(b) (West 2016) (reducing the offense
from a class 3 felony to a class 5 felony); see also Rowe v. People, 856 P.2d 486, 490
(Colo. 1993) (en banc).
89
See People v. Montoya, 582 P.2d 673, 675 (Colo. 1978) (“Such an unreasonably
structured legislative scheme is constitutionally infirm.”).
90
Several jurisdictions recognize provocation as a general sentencing factor
applicable to any crime, including assault. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-17.1(12)(b)(5) (West 2019); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535(1)(a) (West 2019).
Similarly, Alaska allows a sentencing judge to recognize adequate provocation for
assault by imposing a lesser sentence. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.155(d)(6)–(7)
(West 2019); see also Silvera v. State, 244 P.3d 1138, 1147 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).
However, this Note focuses on statutory affirmative defenses and mitigating factors
to be submitted to the jury, rather than factors within the discretion of the trial
court.
91
Rowe, 856 P.2d at 490–91. Note that sentences are also mitigated for second
degree assault committed under the heat of passion. See People v. Howard, 89 P.3d
441, 444 (Colo. App. 2003).
92
People v. Villarreal, 131 P.3d 1119, 1127–28 (Colo. App. 2005), aff’d, 288 P.3d
125 (Colo. 2012) (citing People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 346 (Colo. 2001) (en banc)).
93
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.12 (West 2019).
94
Id.
95
State v. Deem, 533 N.E.2d 294, 299–300 (Ohio 1988) (emphasis in original).
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whole is not a lesser included offense to felonious assault due to
the specific statutory elements of the two offenses.96
Virginia does not recognize mitigation for assault.97
However, Virginia does allow mitigation for a charge of
“malicious wounding,”98 in which the defendant attacks the
victim “with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill.”99
According to Virginia law, “[t]he element in malicious wounding
that distinguishes it from unlawful wounding is malice,
expressed or implied, and malice, in its legal acceptation, means
any wrongful act done willfully or purposefully.”100 Like common
law mitigation for homicide charges, a charge of malicious
wounding is mitigated to the lesser offense of unlawful
wounding101 where the defendant acted under the heat of passion,
which negates a finding of malice.102 An appropriate jury
instruction is given where “there was more than a scintilla of
evidence” that the defendant lacked malice as a result of
passion.103
II. MITIGATION SHOULD BE ALLOWED FOR ASSAULT CHARGES
A defendant should be able to argue EED or adequate
provocation as affirmative defenses to assault charges for four
reasons. First, the same principles of reduced culpability are just
as true where a defendant commits or attempts to commit
assault while suffering EED or following adequate provocation as
they are where a defendant commits or attempts to commit
homicide. Second, allowing the defense to homicide, but not
assault, seems to “reward” defendants for having the worse
intent—that is, to kill rather than injure—at least with respect
to the defenses available to them. Third, failing to allow the
defenses where a defendant is charged with both attempted
murder and assault leads to procedural oddities when juries are
asked to evaluate both charges. Fourth, extending the defenses
96

Id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (West 2019).
98
Williams v. Commonwealth, 767 S.E.2d 252, 256–57 (Va. Ct. App. 2015)
(collecting cases).
99
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-51 (West 2019).
100
Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 426 S.E.2d 137, 140 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (citing
Williamson v. Commonwealth, 23 S.E.2d 240, 241 (Va. 1942)).
101
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-51. Malicious wounding is a Class 3 felony, while
unlawful wounding is a Class 6 felony. Id.
102
Williams, 767 S.E.2d at 256–58.
103
Id. at 257–58.
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would not be counter to public policy, as it would not spread
beyond simple assault charges and likely would not succeed in
most cases, as discussed in Section II.E.
A.

Symmetrical Culpability

All of the traditional justifications given for allowing
mitigation in the context of homicide apply a fortiori to a
defendant who merely intends to cause physical injury under
EED or following adequate provocation, as opposed to one who
intends to cause death. As mentioned above, the purpose of EED
or adequate provocation in the context of homicide is “to identify
cases of intentional homicide where the situation is as much to
blame as the actor,”104 and thus to allow the jury the discretion to
levy a lesser sanction because the defendant is less criminally
culpable than he or she would otherwise have been had he or she
acted with a cool and level head. The same rationale applies to
individuals who commit an assault by causing physical injury to
a victim while operating under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance or following adequate provocation.105
Consider the following case. Suppose D walks in on their
spouse having sexual intercourse with V. Enraged, D takes out a
gun and shoots V in the head, killing V instantly. At trial, D
successfully argues extreme emotional disturbance and that the
disturbance was reasonable under the circumstances (or
adequate provocation in jurisdictions that use that terminology,
standard, or language). Because D is less culpable due to
reasonable rage, D is convicted of manslaughter instead of
murder.
Now suppose D was just as enraged as before, but instead of
killing V, D punches V in the face, causing serious physical
injury. Despite the fact that D was just as enraged as in the
prior case, in most states, D cannot invoke the EED or adequate
provocation defenses, even though these exact facts are an
104
Kirschner et al., supra note 43, at 103 (quoting ALI Commentary, supra note
34, at 71).
105
State v. Butler, 634 N.W.2d 46, 61 (Neb. Ct. App. 2001) (“But the analysis of
provocation which mitigates an intentional killing logically applies to assault cases
as well, given that the core difference between the two crimes is generally whether
the victim lives or dies.”); Reid Griffith Fontaine, On Passion’s Potential to
Undermine Rationality: A Reply, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 207, 231 (2009) (noting
“an inconsistency in how blame is handled” in jurisdictions that recognize an
affirmative defense to mitigate homicide offenses but only discretionary sentencing
factors for assault offenses).
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exemplar case for mitigation in either an EED or adequate
provocation jurisdiction. D’s culpability is decreased just as
much as before since the stimulus is the same. In fact, D’s
culpability is lower because D actually intended the lesser of two
possible results, despite being enraged. Yet in most states, the
defense is unavailable, and D serves a full sentence despite an
identical triggering stimulus.
Because this result would be unjust, states that do not
currently allow a defendant to argue EED or mitigation defenses
for assault crimes should recognize the defenses. The exact same
justifications apply for both types of offenses, at least with
respect to whether the defendant makes a fully rational,
informed choice. Moreover, an emotional reaction does not
become unreasonable simply because one merely intends to cause
physical injury rather than death. The example above highlights
the absurdity of the absence of the defense for the assault
defendant.
B.

Denying the Defense Produces Counterintuitive Results with
Respect to Culpability

Denying defendants the opportunity to argue EED or
adequate provocation in assault cases, while allowing these
defenses to homicide offenses, produces counterintuitive results.
Doing so effectively rewards defendants for having the worse
intent. Culpability involves examining not just the harm the
defendant sought to produce, but also the ability of a defendant
to make choices—that is, to exercise free will. Where one
defendant intends to kill a victim, but another intends merely to
injure, the defendant who intends to kill is clearly more culpable
with respect to the intended result. But both defendants can be
equally culpable with respect to their capacity for free choice if
they have each been adequately provoked or are suffering from
EED since each defendant is equally disturbed, and the law
theoretically treats their disturbance as equally reasonable. Yet,
the effect of allowing the homicidal defendant to establish
mitigation while denying that opportunity to the defendant who
commits assault suggests that the latter’s capacity to make a free
choice no longer matters. Instead, all that matters is the
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intended result, despite the fact that the criminal law has
evolved to emphasize culpability, rather than solely results.106
One might object by pointing out that the EED and adequate
provocation defenses historically evolved as a means of avoiding
overly harsh penalties in certain homicide cases,107 a concern that
does not apply to assault cases because they generally carry a
lower sentence than intentional homicide. There are two possible
responses to the objection. First, the penalty for assault in the
first degree sometimes approaches the penalty for certain
homicide offenses, making the matter just as serious for such
defendants.108 Even for lesser assault offenses, the sentencing
difference between degrees may still be quite significant. For
instance, reducing a conviction of assault in the second degree to
a conviction of assault in the third degree lowers the maximum
Second,
available sentence by over eighty-five percent.109
penalties aside, the grading of offenses largely tracks a
defendant’s culpability. In fact, the defendant who becomes
enraged or afraid, loses control, and then tries to kill someone
loses just as much control as someone who, in the same
circumstances and with the same emotional experience, intends
only to cause physical injury. The degree of the emotional
disturbance would be exactly the same, and the disturbance
itself, just as reasonable—all that would change is the result. If
culpability matters in criminal law, it must carry equal weight
when two defendants equally lose control, but one commits
homicide and the other assault.
C.

Procedural Oddities

Denying defendants access to EED or adequate provocation
defenses may also cause procedural tension where a defendant is
charged with both assault and attempted homicide. In such a
106

See DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 113 & n.7 (citing United States v. CordobaHincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)).
107
People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, 680 (N.Y. 1980).
108
In New York, for instance, assault in the first degree and manslaughter in
the first degree are both class B felonies, punishable by up to twenty-five years in
prison. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.10, 125.20, 70.00(2)(b) (McKinney 2021). But if New
York allowed mitigation for EED, a first degree assault conviction would be reduced
to the class D felony of second degree assault, which is only punishable by up to
seven years in prison. Id. §§ 120.05, 70.00(2)(d).
109
Assault in the second degree is a class D felony in New York, punishable by
up to seven years in prison. Id. §§ 120.05, 70.00(2)(d). Assault in the third degree is
only a class A misdemeanor in New York, punishable by up 364 days in prison, Id.
§§ 120.00, 70.15(1).
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case, the jury is instructed on attempted homicide and the
corresponding mitigation doctrine, as well as on assault. While
the jury theoretically should not consider mitigation until it has
found that the defendant intended to kill, juries may begin
thinking about mitigation before coming to a full decision on the
charges. Assuming the jury does not find the defendant guilty of
intending to kill, the jury must then forget about any mitigation
they may have already considered when addressing the assault
charge. This can produce a counterintuitive tension in the minds
of jurors, who may have, for example, determined that the
defendant was operating under the influence of a reasonable
EED or was adequately provoked but must then ignore the
defendant’s diminished culpability when addressing the assault
charge. Allowing defendants to establish mitigation for both
assault and attempted homicide avoids this counterintuitive
scenario and properly recognizes that a defendant’s decisionmaking is equally compromised where he or she merely intends
to injure, rather than kill, the victim.
D. Existing Remedies Are Inadequate
Existing remedies for the lack of EED and adequate
provocation defenses, such as arguing for mitigation at
sentencing, are inadequate to protect defendants whose
culpability may be decreased. A defendant may argue that he or
she was suffering from EED, or that he or she was adequately
provoked at the time of the attack during sentencing in order to
convince the judge that he or she had no control of his or her
actions and thus deserves a reduced sentence. However, unless
the jurisdiction acknowledges that argument as a pre-set
sentencing factor warranting a downward reduction in the
recommended sentencing range, such considerations will be
entirely within the judge’s discretion. However, if the law
recognized EED or adequate provocation as sentencing factors or
as defenses that reduced the sentencing range as a matter of law,
a judge would be required to reduce the sentence. As a result,
simply arguing the defenses at sentencing is inadequate without
recognizing them in the statute itself, as a judge can simply
decide that those arguments should not apply. It also “would
only serve to mitigate punishment, not blame,” leaving the
underlying inconsistencies in the law’s treatment of culpability—
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and any moral component to way the law views defendants—
unresolved.110
In People v. Charles, a New York court noted that the
defendant could argue EED on a motion to dismiss the charges in
the interest of justice, even though he could not argue the
defense at trial.111 However, a motion to dismiss the charges is
also an inadequate remedy because it forces the defendant to try
to seek dismissal of the entire charge—a much harder task than
seeking simply to mitigate it down to a lesser offense. Further,
allowing mitigation in such cases is “a matter of judicial
discretion.”112 While a motion is inadequate because a judge is
free to decide that circumstances do not warrant dismissal,
judges may not ignore an affirmative defense if proven to a jury.
E.

Public Policy

Allowing a defendant to establish mitigation for EED or
adequate provocation would not undermine public policy because
recognizing the offense merely “provide[s] the same type of
mitigating, degree-reducing factor in the law of assault as exists
While one might argue that
in the law of homicide.”113
recognizing such a defense opens the door to defendants
establishing mitigation for other violent offenses, such as sexual
assault, rape, strangulation, or gang assault, a legislature is free
to apply the defense to simple assaults only, rather than all
violent offenses.
Moreover, a jury must still find that the
defendant’s EED or the provocation at issue was reasonable
under the circumstances, and studies suggest that juries largely
only find that bar met where a defendant feared he or she was
about to be harmed or suffered from some other mental illness,
and not where a defendant was merely enraged.114 Thus, the
requirements of the offense itself provide a sufficient check to
ensure that the defense is not applied in unreasonable cases.
Furthermore, the defense is intended to reduce punishment
where a defendant in fact lacked full control over his or her
actions.
Promulgating a law that clearly establishes that

110

Griffith Fontaine, supra note 105, at 231–32.
13 Misc. 3d 985, 987 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2006) (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 210.40(1)(a), (d) (McKinney 2020) (allowing judges to dismiss charges in the
interest of justice)).
112
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40(1) (McKinney 2020).
113
LRC Commentary, supra note 79.
114
Kirschner et al., supra note 43, at 130–31.
111
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culpability bears on the severity of an offense in all contexts
promotes justice by creating a clear, consistent system of laws
that treats similar cases similarly and subjects all defendants to
the same standard, free of arbitrary variations. Because the
defense only applies where disturbance or passion is reasonable,
recognizing the defense in assault cases would be limited and
would not be against public policy.
III. MODEL LEGISLATION
This section suggests and evaluates three types of legislation
for implementing EED and adequate provocation as affirmative
defenses to assault charges: (1) the general affirmative defense
approach; (2) the specific affirmative defense approach; and (3) as
an element of the offense in question.
A.

General Affirmative Defense

Following the Kentucky model, jurisdictions can incorporate
a general affirmative defense of EED or adequate provocation in
their criminal code.115 Kentucky’s EED affirmative defense
applies to any offense “in which intentionally causing physical
injury or serious physical injury is an element of the offense.”116
In an MPC jurisdiction, the legislature could implement the
following text:
In any offense for which intentionally causing physical injury or
serious physical injury is an element of the offense,117 it shall be
an affirmative defense that the defendant acted under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance, the reasonableness
of which is determined from the viewpoint of the defendant
under the circumstances as he or she believed them to be.118
This section shall not apply to any strangulation, gang assault,
rape, or sexual assault offense.

In a common law, adequate provocation state, the legislature
could adopt the following language:
In any offense for which intentionally causing physical injury or
serious physical injury is an element of the offense, it shall be
an affirmative defense that the defendant was adequately
provoked, where the adequacy of the provocation is reasonable
from the perspective of the defendant under the circumstances
115
116
117
118

See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.040 (West 2019).
Id. § 508.040(1).
Id.
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a)(i) (McKinney 2019).
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as he or she believed them to be. This section shall not apply to
any strangulation, gang assault, rape, or sexual assault offense.

B.

Specific Affirmative Defense

Alternatively, states can insert specific provisions into each
offense for which the legislature wishes the defense to apply. For
example, the New York legislature could insert a new provision
into its existing first degree assault statute,119 stating:
In a prosecution for assault, it shall be an affirmative defense to
assault in the first degree that the defendant acted under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance, the reasonableness
of which is determined from the viewpoint of the defendant
under the circumstances as he or she believed them to be.120 A
defendant who successfully establishes the defense when
charged with assault in the first degree will be guilty of assault
in the second degree.

By adding such language to each degree of assault (with
substitutions of appropriate language for each reference to a
lesser included offense), the legislature enables the defense to be
invoked solely for assault, and mandates that the offense is
reduced to the next most serious assault offense, just as the EED
affirmative defense under New York homicide law mitigates
second degree murder down to the next most serious offense,
manslaughter in the first degree, assuming the prosecutor
requests an instruction.121
C.

Legislation Incorporating Mitigation as an Element of the
Offense

Following the Missouri model, a state could also incorporate
the defense into the elements of the lesser offense.122 In New
York, for example, a defendant is guilty of assault in the first
degree when, “[w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury to
another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third
person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous

119

See generally id. § 120.10 (1996).
See, e.g., id. § 125.25(1)(a)(i) (2019).
121
See id. (“Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a
prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any
other crime.”).
122
See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.052(2) (West 2017).
120
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instrument.”123 If New York were to implement this approach, a
new provision might read:
A defendant is guilty of assault in the second degree when,
[w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury to another person,
he causes such injury to such person or to a third person,124
provided that the defendant establishes, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that he or she was acting under the influence of
extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a
reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which
is to be determined from the perspective of the defendant under
the circumstances as he or she believed them to be.125

Analogous language would be added for each grading of the
offense.
CONCLUSION
Jurisdictions that do not recognize EED or adequate
provocation—as either affirmative defenses or sentencing factors
for assault—should pass legislation permitting application of the
defenses, especially since those jurisdictions already allow the
defenses for homicide and attempted homicide. In both homicide
and assault offenses, the culpability of the defendant is equally
reduced by the provocation or the emotional disturbance. In the
interest of public policy, jurisdictions may also limit application
of the defenses based on the wording of the statute. And, no
matter what, a jury must still find that the disturbance was
reasonable for the defense to succeed preventing undesirable
outcomes. The best available option is to add the defense to each
specific statute because it allows the legislature to confine the
defense to specific offenses, rather than opening the door for a
defendant to argue EED or adequate provocation as mitigation
for any crime. However, whether the jurisdiction follows the
traditional common law scheme or the MPC scheme, the defense
can and should be recognized as a matter of legal and conceptual
symmetry.

123
124
125

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10(1) (McKinney 1996).
Id. § 120.05 (2016).
Id. § 125.25(1)(a)(i) (2019).

